Articles Posted in Internet Law

The issue of online service provider liability comes up often in today’s high-tech world. In order to promote free discussion and private investment in the Internet, the United States Congress immunized providers of “interactive computer service[s]” against liability arising out of content provided for publication by any other “information content provider.” See Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230. This section does not limit the application of intellectual property laws or criminal laws, but it protects Internet service providers and website operators against a broad range of tort, contract, and other claims arising out of content created by third parties.

Section 230(c)(2)(A) states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of…any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”

Section 230(c)(2)(B), provides immunity for “any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to [such material].” The immunity offered under Section 230(c)(2) is also referred to as the “Good Samaritan” protection.

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the United States Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment limits common-law defamation claims brought by public officials. The Court held that to recover for publication of a defamatory falsehood, a public official must prove that the challenged statement was “of and concerning” the public official plaintiff, that the statement was false, and that the defendant acted with “actual malice.” The Court defined “actual malice” as publication with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether the statement was false or not.

Later, the Supreme Court extended the standard announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to defamation cases brought by “public figures.” Public figures include individuals who voluntarily inject themselves into public controversy, as well as those who are involuntarily thrust into the limelight, even if only with respect to a particular activity or incident.

A private-figure defamation plaintiff can recover damages based on the defendant’s negligence (or a more speech-protective standard, under the law of some states). In no instance, however, can a private-figure plaintiff recover damages for defamation without a showing of fault amounting to, at least, negligence. Any lesser standard, the Supreme Court concluded, would unduly burden free speech. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). And, at least when the speech relates to an issue of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff must bear the burden of proving falsity; the defendant speaker is not obligated to prove the truth of the challenged statements. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768 (1986).

The Securities and Exchange Commission stated that publicly-traded companies should disclose the threat and potential impact of cyber attacks that pose a risk to their investors.

The commission made its comments in a letter to Senator Jay Rockefeller, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, that was released on June 8, 2011. Last month, Senator Rockefeller and four other Democratic senators wrote a letter to SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, urging the agency to issue guidance on disclosure of data- security risk, including “material network breaches,” attacks that may result in the theft of intellectual property or trade secrets.